Abstract
Introduction
The World Wide Web (WWW) is one of the primary reasons for the current success of the Internet. It has been so successful that many users think of them as synonyms. The WWW is a client-server technology: information is available on servers and is accessed by clients. The communication between these two parties is defined in the HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP) [3] .
To be more useful today and in the future, the WWW needs to be secured. Services such as entity authentication, data authentication, data confidentiality and nonrepudiation are essential for applications such as those used in electronic commerce or in an Intranet environment.
A lot of effort has already been done to secure the WWW. This paper intends to give an overview of the current situation with a focus on more practical issues. We start with an overview of the proposed protocols and the current status of the U.S. export regulations. Weaknesses in SSL 2.0 are exploited in an attack. We then focus on setting up a secure server and adding strong cryptography to export browsers. Finally, we look at the performance of the system.
Protocols
There are currently four proposals for providing security services to the WWW: -Netscape's Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) [9] ; -Microsoft's Private Communication Technology (PCT) [22] ; -Secure HyperText Transfer Protocol (S-HTTP) [20] , from Enterprise Integration Technologies and Terisa Systems; -Transport Layer Security (TLS) [7] , an IETF working group. All four protocols provide entity authentication, data authentication and data confidentiality. In contrary to SSL and PCT, which are both situated in the transport layer, S-HTTP is situated in the application layer, and can thus offer nonrepudiation of origin (in a legal sense). Both PCT and S-HTTP have not been a success. SSL has become a de facto standard on the Internet. The current version of SSL is 3.0 and it has a number of improvements [6, 23] over release 2.0 [11] (see 2.2). There are free implementations available such as SSLeay [26] and SSLRef [17] .
As a successor to SSL, the IETF has organized a working group TLS (Transport Layer Security) that has adopted SSL 3.0 in its initial release of TLS 1.0. TLS offers the same services as SSL, but there are some minor differences. As the first TLS based products are already being implemented, TLS will probably replace SSL in the future.
Export regulations and limitations
The U.S. export policy has serious implications on the level of security that can be obtained by the most popular WWW browsers and servers.
Until January 1997, the strongest cryptography that U.S. companies were allowed to export was limited to a 40 bit security level. Thus, the international versions of Netscape Navigator and Internet Explorer (the two most popular browsers) were limited to 40 bit security. '40 bit security' applies to the maximum length of the key used for symmetric encryption. Keys used for asymmetric encryption (key management) are limited to 512 bits.
The maximum level of security that can be exported is now 56 bits. There are unfortunately certain restrictions. The export of 56 bit is only allowed if the vendor commits to implementing key recovery by January 1, 1999, and a governmental approval is needed for each customer the product is transferred to. As the export of 56 bit still implies such restrictions, the IETF-TLS working group still defines 40 bit in the export ciphers used in TLS [7] .
It is also possible to offer high level security (128 bits or more) to international companies, if it can be shown that it is necessary (e.g., financial institutions, banks). In that case, strong cryptography in export browsers can be enabled by a Global Server Certificate from VeriSign.
It is obvious that export products do not fully provide data confidentiality as their encryption routines are limited to (practically) 40 bit [4] . The quality of the user authentication service should not be influenced, although export browsers cannot generate keys used for client authentication longer than 512 bit (though it is possible to generate longer keys with an other program and import them in your browser). When 128 bit (MAC)keys are exchanged using 512 bit RSA, they do not represent a full 128 bit strength, as breaking 512 bit RSA is easier than a 128 bit exhaustive search (but still much more difficult than 40 bit).
Security problems
We can distinguish three categories:
Security flaws in the protocol. Release 2.0 of the SSL protocol contained several security flaws [6, 23] . These flaws were solved in the SSL 3.0 specification: -SSL 3.0 uses a HMAC-like [2] construction which is more secure than the MAC construction in SSL 2.0.
-In SSL 2.0, the MAC secret and the encryption key are the same. It is more secure to use different keys. Moreover, also the MAC secret is limited by the export restrictions.
-The integrity of the handshake messages is not ensured in SSL 2.0.
-The export regulations restrict the length of the 'key' used for encryption. In SSL 2.0, this is applied to the exchanged Master Key (which is used during a session). Also note that the Master Key in SSL 2.0 is chosen by the client only. In SSL 3.0 the restriction applies to encryption keys (used in one connection) derived from a large Pre Master Key. From this Pre Master Key, a Master Key is derived with input from both parties.
-In SSL 2.0, the client authentication token is not dependent on the global handshake.
The last flaws result in a possible attack scenario where an attacker can authenticate to the server as another client if this attacker has discovered the Master Key used in the session between this client and the server [6, 23] . Note that many servers still use SSL 2.0 (e.g., Amazon.com).
The attack is visualized in Figure 1 and the notation is described in Table 1 . Suppose that a WWW-server offers more services to clients in a 128 bit session where the client authenticates. An international client has set up a 40 bit secured connection to the server. An attacker can then obtain the Master Secret by an exhaustive search on this 40 bit secret. Within the current session, the client asks for a new connection. To this end it sends the session ID and some Challenge Data to the server.
The attacker intercepts this request message and replaces the 40 bit algorithms, that the client asks for, with 128 bit algorithms. The same Master Key is used because the connection is made in the same session.
The server receives the request and decides to grant it. It sends back a Connection ID to the client. All parties involved (client, server, attacker) can now calculate the new connection keys (40 bits for the client, and 128 bits for the attacker and server), because these only depend on the Master Secret, the Challenge Data and the Connection ID. The server now asks the 'client' for authentication by sending it the Certificate-Challenge Data encrypted to the attacker. The attacker forwards this packet to the client.
The unsuspicious client then sends its Certificate and a signature on a message to the server. This message depends on the Certificate-Challenge Data, the Server Certificate, the Master Key, the Challenge and the Connection ID. Because this signature does not depend on the actual key strength or the algorithms used, the attacker is able to replay this token to the server to authenticate itself as the client.
In this way, the server offers the extra services to the attacker. Moreover, the attacker also masquerades effectively as the client. At the same time, the attacker can act as the server (provided that it intercepts all messages sent by the client to the server).
In SSL 3.0 this attack does not succeed because the client also signs all previous handshake messages (thus also the one in which it requests a 40 bit connection) in the last step.
Implementation problems. On the whole SSL 3.0 is quite secure [25] . A bad implementation however can also cause problems. Especially the generation of random num- bers, essential to all the protocols mentioned above, is a difficult task. An earlier version of the Netscape browser had a security weakness due to a bad implemented random generator [10] . Versions of Internet Explorer also appear to have bugs. Practical problems. Not only the protocol and the implementation are important. The security of the system can be questioned if other programs (e.g., viruses) or users can read the part of the memory allocated for the temporary storage of decrypted messages or secret keys. Security holes can also arise during the installation of the secure server (see 3.4).
Server
In this section, we discuss the server side.
Apache-SSLeay based secure server
Commercially available software can be chosen for setting up a secure server. It is also possible to setup a secure server based on source code that is publicly available and that is not limited by any export regulation. This can be done by using the SSLeay library [26] , which can be integrated in Apache, a plain http server of which the source code is also available. The Apache-SSLeay [13] approach has become very popular and is used more and more in both academic and commercial environments. Note that studies show that Apache is used by 50% of all web sites.
Obtaining a server certificate
A certificate is needed before the server can actually offer services on the World Wide Web. Certificates normally have to be obtained from a Certification Authority (CA).
The easiest way to get a server certificate is to create one using the SSLeay package. In that case, the certificate is not (and should not be) recognized and trusted by a standard browser. It is however possible to add this kind of certificate to the list of trusted certificates. A cautious client should only do this if it has more background information of the server, as in an Intranet situation.
Another way to obtain the certificate is to get one from an official CA such as Verisign or Thawte. By default, the browsers contain the certificates of these CAs, and the issued server certificate can thus be verified. This method is preferred, especially if worldwide access to the server is needed. A disadvantage is the long certification procedure and the cost of the certificate.
Access control
It is possible to have the access to some of the server pages restricted. This is useful if the information on these pages is confidential and should not be available to the general public, or if the client has to register before he is allowed to access the pages.
If a page with restricted access is requested, the clients need some kind of mechanism to prove their identity, and the server has to be able to verify it. Several mechanisms can be used for this purpose:
Username/Password. The Username/Password technique is already provided by normal servers. In most cases, the password is sent from client to server in cleartext (more precisely, base64 encoded). When using SSL, the communication is encrypted, including the password. This technique remains however vulnerable to password guessing and dictionary attacks.
X.509 client certificates. Access can also be granted based on SSL's client authentication. The server administrator can act as a CA and issue certificates only to those people who may access the page. It is also possible to use certificates of an existing CA and to verify the distinguished name they contain.
Attribute certificates.
Another possibility is to use the Role Based Access Control (RBAC) mechanism. Access is granted to people based on their role (e.g., secretary, accountant, manager, etc). Attribute certificates are credentials that prove which roles one is allowed to act as. They are usually administered centrally and are issued by an Attribute Server. An alternative could be the use of proprietary extensions in the X.509 certificates. One of the advantages of this system over the X.509 based certificates is that a certificate revocation mechanism is not needed as attribute certificates are issued with a limited lifetime. Manageability is also an advantage of RBAC as access restrictions only have to be defined for each role and not for each user.
Role Based Access Control is implemented for example in the SESAME environment [24] , and it is used in TrustedWeb [21] .
Security of the server
A number of problems can arise when installing the server. The implemented access control is only performed when accessing the server via the WWW. Everybody who can login to the machine the server is running on, might access the server pages locally. They might also try to locate the server's private key. Therefore, the server's private key should be readable only for the https deamon. The key should also be encrypted, so that a (non-trivial) password has to be provided at the startup of the server. These precautions are all necessary to ensure the server's private key is indeed private. Generating the keys yourself when requesting the server certificate is of course the primary condition to be sure of the secrecy of your server's private key.
Client
To communicate with the server, the client needs an application called the browser. The two most popular browsers are those from Netscape Communications and Microsoft. These browsers both contain an implementation of the SSL protocol. The main concern outside the U.S. is that they use weak cryptography as they are subject to the U.S. export regulations. We now look at some solutions that provide browsers with strong cryptography (i.e., 128-bit or more). Figure 2 gives a systematic view of the methods discussed above and the export situation. In all cases, a document is transferred from server to client. The figure indicates how many encryption/decryption transformations occur and whether they use strong (s) or weak (w) cryptography. In most cases, it is not necessary to use encryption in the weak session. It is still a cryptographically enhanced session (a MAC is used).
Alternative browser
An obvious way to get strong cryptography, is the use of an alternative browser such as Mosaic. The source code, which is publicly available, can be modified to integrate the SSLeay library [26] . There are also some other browsers available which provide strong cryptography. Examples are Internet Workhorse [14] and Opera [18] . If the use of a popular browser is preferred, other solutions have to be provided.
Proxy
A proxy is a different approach to get strong cryptography. This solution allows the user to continue using a familiar browser. The proxy is a program that intercedes transparently between the browser and the WWW server.
Strong cryptography is used in the communication between proxy and server. This communication can be a normal https connection, SafePassage Web Proxy [5] is a product that is based on this principle, or a SOCKS based connection, as used in VPNs.
Tunneling at application layer
A second way to add strong cryptography to an existing browser is to use a mechanism called tunneling. In this method, client and server set up a secure session on top of a less secure session. At the client side, this can be implemented by a Java applet running within the existing browser. At the server side there is also something extra needed to process the messages originated from the Java applet. It is clear that this method is meaningless if the client wants to connect to a normal secure server.
'Upside down' tunneling
When a proxy is used both at the client and the server side, a lot of calculations have to be performed. Indeed, the server's proxy has to decrypt the encrypted message received from the server, encrypt it again, and send it to the client's proxy. This proxy has to decrypt the message, encrypt it again, and send it to the browser.
It is however possible to omit the decryption at the server's proxy and the encryption at the client's proxy. In this way, a kind of tunneling is obtained in which the secure session is set up beneath the export session. This should improve the performance.
New connection
When using Java applets in browsers, a new connection is mostly opened, independent of the browser's http(s) connection. Sensitive data can be retrieved from both the web server or another application, and is transferred over this secured connection. Many applications use this method, and there are several Java SSL libraries available, such as iSaSiLk [12] , SSLava [19] and J/SSL [1] .
Proxy and spoofing
In this section, we propose a method for providing strong cryptography to U.S. export browsers, which is a combination of a proxy and a technique called 'spoofing' [8] . As in the proxy method, there are no enhancements at the server side. There is however less overhead at the client side.
Whenever the browser requests a 'page'
http://localhost/https.www.server.com, the client proxy translates this URL into the real one: https://www.server.com, and initiates the communication with the real server. The page retrieved from this server, is delivered to the browser using plain http. Some mechanism has to be provided so that all the links on the new page refer to the local host, instead of directly to a secure server. This could be done by changing all the links before delivering the page to the browser. It is also possible to use a Java applet that changes the link after clicking it.
We have a demonstration version based on a Java applet and the iSaSiLk library.
Modifying the export browser itself
All the previous solutions don't modify the browser itself. In general it is not possible to change the source code and recompile the browser, as the source code is not published. On the other hand, changing the executable code itself is possible but seems rather difficult.
In October '97 however, Fortify [15] was announced on the Internet. As it turns out, it is indeed possible to change the export Netscape browser to a U.S. version with full cryptographic capabilities, by changing a number of bytes in the executable code of the browser.
The public release of the source code of Netscape Communicator 5.0 in March '98 opened new perspectives. The Mozilla Crypto Group [16] managed to integrate SSLeay in the Netscape browser.
Comparison
When using tunneling or when a new connection is set up, both client and server need to be changed. If a client wants a secure connection with a normal secure server, proxy mechanisms are a solution. The performance of the proxy-spoofing method should be better than the normal proxy method as there is less overhead.
Modifying the existing browser of course leads to the best performance as there are no additional modules. Disadvantage is that there is a different patch needed for each version on each platform.
With applets that open a separate connection, there is also no security overhead. It is however necessary to build in browser functionality.
An important factor in solutions that make use of Java applets, is that they are responsible for a lot of computationally heavy cryptographic operations. As the performance of these applets is less than the performance of native code, Figure 2 . Adding strong cryptography to export browsers this will be a deciding factor whether this type of solution can be afforded. Downloading Java applets cannot just be done on top of normal http. Even if a signed applet is used, server authentication (not affected by export regulations) is still preferred, as everybody can use an applet of someone else.
Forced to use weak cryptography
Even if the client is provided with strong cryptography it is not always possible to have a secure session with a server. We have experienced that some servers in the U.S. do not allow secure sessions with clients outside the U.S. When we tried to connect to https://www.verisign.com, we were only able to use export versions of RC2 and RC4. These servers determine the location of the client (e.g., using the IP address) and decide whether to grant the use of strong cryptography or not.
Using methods for other purposes
The discussed methods can also be used for other purposes than upgrading an export browser. Normal browsers (export or not) don't support the use of smartcards. Also other security related functionality can be added via proxy mechanisms of by modifying the browser. The use of separate connections via Java applets can be more suitable for the secure integration of non-http based applications.
Performance
Due to the security enhancements of the WWW, a decrease in performance is expected. We look at two different setups. In the first case, we compare a normal http session with a secure session. In the second case, we look at the maximum number of clients that can initiate a connection with the server per second.
One server / One client
In this setup, we concentrate on a single session between one server and one client. Downloading data via a secured session takes longer. There are mainly three reasons for this.
Firstly, the security enhancements demand a lot of cryptographic calculations. If the network connection is fast, this overhead of calculations has a large effect on performance. If the data throughput is rather small, the effect of cryptographic calculations is minor.
Due to the MACs and the handshake, there is more data to send between server and client. The effect on performance is large if the network connection is slow. The handshake messages are about 1 kilobytes of extra data. Every other message contains about 20 bytes overhead. Sometimes this can be 10% of the total message, as http messages (especially from client to server) are not so big.
Finally, just like random text, encrypted messages cannot be compressed. This means that the compression algorithms used by modems have no effect during a secure communication. It is possible to achieve the same amount of compression as in the normal communication by compressing the plaintext before encrypting it. Note that in the TLS standard, compression is already foreseen, but no compression method has been defined yet.
One server / Many clients
Whenever a clients initiates a new session with the server, a handshake has to be performed. In case of RSA based key exchange, the server has to perform a private key RSA operation to decrypt the key material provided by the client. This is a very computational intensive calculation. Therefore, the amount of new sessions that can be initiated by the server per second is rather limited. Extra dedicated hardware can improve the performance.
Conclusion
In this paper we have discussed the issues that arise when securing the WWW. We reviewed the current status of protocols and export regulations. An attack on SSL 2.0 shows how some of its weaknesses can be exploited.
It is possible to set up a secure server with freely available software. In this modern age of linking every computer to a network, there is a clear need for an access control mechanism. In an Intranet situation, a solution based on attribute certificates would enhance the overall security and manageability of the system.
Just as important as the server, is the client end of the communication. Although there are already different solutions available to increase the level of security of the export browser, we propose an approach by using the Web spoofing technique to our advantage. We also suggest an improvement of an existing concept.
